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I.

Introduction
This year of uncertainty and waiting. The Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging
whether agency fee was constitutional in the public sector. (Friederichs) The Court held oral
argument on Monday, January 11, 2016, and it appeared poised to find agency fees
unconstitutional. In a turn of historical significance, the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia may have significant repercussions for Friedrichs. While no one knows for sure what will
happen, Scalia's death strengthens the likelihood that the forty years of precedent finding agency
fees constitutional will not be overturned in this case. In the Fisher case, the Supreme Court
surprised observers by taking up the question of affirmative action for the second time.
We are beginning to see the impact of the Board’s seminal decision in Pacific Lutheran
University which modified the standards used to determine two important issues affecting the
ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education institutions to unionize under the
National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions and their faculty members are
exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities; and second, whether certain
faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act. Both changes helped
improve the prospects for unionizing faculty in the private sector. The NLRB Regional Directors,
who decide election cases in the first instance, are now applying the new standards to address
whether purportedly religious institutions are exempt from coverage (see cases listed under Pacific
Luther University, infra section VII, A, 2) and whether faculty are managers (see cases listed under
Pacific Lutheran University, infra section VII, B, 1).
In addition, there are two pending cases before the Board involving the unionization of
graduate students. (Columbia University, New School.) In the Columbia University case, the Board
issued an invitation to file amicus briefs addressing whether the Board should modify or overrule
its 2004 decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not
employees and therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. Federal government actions
addressing exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act and sexual misconduct under Title IX
could also have significant ramifications for collective bargaining between unions and university
employers.
This year was also an active one for cases involving the First Amendment Rights of public
sector faculty members. The lower courts began to apply the 2014 Supreme Court decision in Lane
that held that a public employee’s speech that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within
the scope of their duties, is subject to First Amendment protection. Interesting decisions were also
issued by state courts and labor relations boards in public sector collective bargaining cases.
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II.

First Amendment and Speech Rights
A. Garcetti / Citizen Speech
Lane v. Franks, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312 (U.S. 2014)
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak
as a citizen when he was subpoena’d to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment.
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”
Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a
program operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). Lane in the course of his
duties as director conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne
Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative who was on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for
work. As a result Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment. Federal authorities soon indicted
Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane was subpoenaed and testified regarding the events
that led to the termination of Schmitz at CITY. Schmitz was later convicted. Steve Franks, then
CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees under the auspices of financial
difficulties. Soon afterward, however, “Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those
of Lane and one other employee”. Lane sued alleging that Franks had violated the First
Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.
The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the
individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding
that Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because he acted in accordance to his official duties
when he investigated and terminated Schmitz’ employment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals as to “whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary
job responsibilities”.
The Court held that Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court
explained that under Garcetti, the initial inquiry was into whether the case involved speech as a
citizen, which may trigger First Amendment protection, or speech as an employee, which would
not trigger such protection. In Lane the Court provided a more detailed explanation of employee
versus citizen speech, and expanded the range of speech that is protected. The Court explained that
“the mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public
2

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/69
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1627

6

Nisenson: Annual Legal Update (2016)

employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen--speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” And the Court found that
“Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen.”
The Court further determined that Lane’s speech was protected under the First
Amendment. First, Lane’s speech about the corruption of a public program is “obviously” a matter
of public concern and further that testimony within a judicial proceeding is a “quintessential
example” of citizen speech. Second, the employer could not demonstrate any interest in limiting
this speech to promote the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees or
“that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information”.
The Court held that Franks could not be sued in his individual capacity on the basis of
qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, courts should not award damages against a government
official in their personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,”
and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Because of the
ambiguity of Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the conduct, the right was not “clearly
established” and thus the test unsatisfied to defeat qualified immunity. Lane’s speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection, but Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. As a result of this case
the right is clearly established and is now the standard.
B. Faculty Speech
Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2014)
In this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it violated the termination of a
faculty member for stating that a member of congress was a “fear monger” violated the First
Amendment. Christian Cutler brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against university officials at
Stephen F. Austin State University, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising protected
speech after telling a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that Rep. Gohmert was
a "fear monger." Cutler, the director of the University's art galleries, claimed that a member of
Rep. Gohmert's staff called Cutler to invite him to judge a high school art exhibition that would be
hosted by Rep. Gohmert in Tyler, Texas. Cutler asked for more details, but never received any. He
then researched Rep. Gohmert on the internet, formed a negative impression of him, and decided
to decline the invitation to judge the contest. Following an exchange of messages with members
of Rep. Gohmert's staff, Cutler told a staff member he was not interested in judging the art show
and made the "fear monger" comment. Cutler then received a letter from Rep. Gohmert, copying
university president Dr. Baker Pattillo, expressing disappointment that the University would not
host the competition. The university then gave Cutler a letter of termination. After Cutler was
given the opportunity to resign and did so, he filed suit.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the law was clearly established and gave Defendants fair
warning that terminating Cutler on the basis of his speech to Rep. Gohmert would violate Cutler's
First Amendment rights. In reaching that decision, the Court assumed that Cutler alleged a
3
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violation of his First Amendment rights because Defendants had effectively abandoned any
argument that he did not. Based on the undisputed facts and making all reasonable inferences in
Cutler's favor, the Fifth Circuit found that several of its pre-2010 decisions, which applied the
general rule announced in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), to new fact patterns, should
have given Defendants a clear warning that terminating Cutler because of his speech to Rep.
Gohmert's office would violate Cutler's First Amendment rights. Cutler's speech was made
externally to a staff member of a public official about participating in an event that was not within
his job requirements. The concerns Cutler expressed during those conversations were unrelated to
his job and emanated from his views as a citizen.
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014)
In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members. (Important note, a
previous opinion by the Ninth Circuit in this case dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729
F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.) Adopting an approach advanced in
AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic speech.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Garcetti analysis did not apply to "speech related to
scholarship or teaching,” and therefore the First Amendment could protect this speech even when
undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.
Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) WSU
in 1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999. Demers taught journalism and mass communications
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication. Starting in 2008,
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower
of Babel. Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted
internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his
publications.
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim on the ground that Demers
made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member. Unlike most recent cases
involving free speech infringement at public universities, the district court’s analysis did not center
on the language from Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Instead, the court applied a five
part test set out by the Ninth Circuit in a series of public employee speech cases and found that
Demers was not speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern. Therefore, the district
court found his speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas Jefferson Center
for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of Demers. The amicus
brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis, but instead was
governed by the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563
4
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(1968). In two opinions, the Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that
the First Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.
In an initial opinion issued on September 4, 2013, the Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti did
not apply to “teaching and writing on academic matters by teachers employed by the state,” even
when undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher or professor. Demers v. Austin, 729
F.3d 1011 (September 4, 2013). Instead, as argued in the amicus brief, the court held that academic
employee speech on such matters was protected under the Pickering balancing test. The court
found that the pamphlet prepared by Demers was protected as it addressed a matter of public
concern but remanded the case for further proceedings. The University filed a petition for panel
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc.
On January 29, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion
denying the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc and withdrawing
and modifying its previous opinion. Originally, the court held that "teaching and writing on
academic matters" by publicly-employed teachers could be protected by the First Amendment
because they are governed by Pickering v. Board of Education, not by Garcetti v. Ceballos. In its
2014 superseding opinion, the Ninth Circuit expanded that ruling to hold that Garcetti does not
apply to "speech related to scholarship or teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not –
indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that
are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”
The Ninth Circuit held specifically that the 7-Step plan was “related to scholarship or
teaching” within the meaning of Garcetti because “it was a proposal to implement a change at the
Murrow School that, if implemented, would have substantially altered the nature of what was
taught at the school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.” The court thus
considered whether the Demers pamphlet was protected under the Pickering balancing test.
Academic employee speech is protected under the First Amendment by the Pickering analysis if
it is a (1) matter of public concern, and (2) outweighs the interest of the state in promoting
efficiency of service. The court held that the pamphlet addressed a matter of “public concern”
within the meaning of Pickering because it was broadly distributed and “contained serious
suggestions about the future course of an important department of WSU.” The case was remanded
to the district court, however, to determine (1) whether WSU had a “sufficient interest in
controlling” the circulation of the plan, (2) whether the circulation was a “substantial motivating
factor in any adverse employment action, and (3) whether the University would have taken the
action in the absence of protected speech.
C. Union Speech
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. March 3,
2016) on remand from 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014)
In this case the United States district court applied a 2014 the U.S. Court of Appeals
decision finding in favor of a contingent professor. In the appeals court case, the Seventh Circuit
5
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greatly enhanced constitutional protection for outspoken critics of public college and
university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent and congenial decisions in two other
federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and North Carolina (Adams). The court
specifically relied on a sympathetic view of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Garcetti case,
expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech and press protections for academic
speakers and writers. The three-judge panel unanimously declared that an Illinois community
college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct teacher for writing a letter criticizing the
administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised publicly and visibly constituted “matters
of public concern.”
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution and therefore a protected
property interest. The appellate court ruled that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers.
On remand, the district court denied motions for summary judgment by both the College
and Meade. One of the primary arguments advanced by the College was that the letter which
prompted the termination addressed private interests and not matters of public concern. However,
the court found that the Seventh Circuit had already ruled in favor of Meade on this issue. Since
the College pointed to no evidence to show that the content of the letter was any different than it
was on appeal, the court rejected its argument. Similarly, on the due process claims, the district
court reiterated that the Seventh Circuit had rejected the college’s argument that because Meade’s
classes could be cancelled, she had no property interest in her employment. As the lower court
explained, “The mere fact that Meade might not end up teaching anticipated courses does not
negate her protected property interest.” Therefore, the court rejected the college’s motion for
summary judgment. The court also rejected Meade’s motion for summary judgment finding that
there was not sufficient evidence to conclude as a matter of law that she was entitled to prevail on
her claims without a trial.
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015)
In this case, a U.S. District in Massachusetts ruled that speech made by a teacher as a union
representative was protected under the First Amendment finding that the Garcetti test did not apply
because speech was not a part of her normal employment duties as clarified in Lane v. Franks.
This case arose out of the September 2012 termination of the plaintiff, Jennifer Meagher
("Meagher"), from her employment as a tenured teacher at Andover High School ("AHS") in
Andover, Massachusetts. Prior to her termination, Meagher and other members of the teachers'
union, the Andover Education Association ("AEA" or "Union"), were involved in contentious
negotiations with the Andover School Committee over a new collective bargaining agreement. In
6
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addition, AHS was engaged in the process of seeking re-accreditation pursuant to the standards
established by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges ("NEASC"). The
accreditation process centered on a self-study, which required teachers and administrators at AHS
to conduct evaluations of the school's programs, prepare separate reports addressing one of seven
accreditation standards, and present the reports to the faculty for approval. Under the NEASC
guidelines, each report required approval by a two-thirds majority vote of the faculty. It was
undisputed that Meagher was discharged from employment, effective September 17, 2012,
because she sent an email to approximately sixty other teachers in which she urged them to enter
an "abstain" vote on the ballots for each of the self-study reports as a means of putting the
accreditation process on hold and using it to gain leverage in the collective bargaining negotiations.
Meagher alleged that the decision to terminate her for writing and distributing the email to her
colleagues constituted unlawful retaliation for, and otherwise interfered with, the exercise of her
First Amendment right to engage in free speech.
The fundamental issue was whether Meagher's email to her colleagues is entitled to
protection under the First Amendment. Pursuant to Garcetti v. Ceballos, her speech would be
protected if she were speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern rather than pursuant to
her duties as a teacher when she distributed the communication, and if the value of her speech was
not outweighed by the defendants' interest in preventing unnecessary disruptions to the efficient
operation of the Andover public schools.
In reviewing the facts, the court found that Meagher was speaking as a citizen.
The record on summary judgment establishes that Meagher was speaking as a
citizen, and not an employee of the Andover School Department, when she
distributed the June 10, 2012 email at issue in this case. There is no dispute that
Meagher wrote the email on her personal, home computer, and distributed it to her
colleagues using her personal email account. Moreover, there is no dispute that she
sent the communication during non-working hours, that she contacted the recipients
using their personal email accounts, and that the email concerned issues that were
addressed in the press and triggered considerable discussion among members of the
local com-munity. The substance of the email, in which Meagher advocated use of
the "abstain" option on the ballots for the self-study reports as a means of delaying
the NEASC re-accreditation process and gaining leverage in the contract dispute
between the Union and the ASC, would not have given objective observers the
impression that Meagher was representing her employer when she communicated
with her colleagues. . . . Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Meagher was
working in her capacity as a Union activist rather than in her capacity as a high
school English teacher, when she distributed the communication in question.
The court also found that the value of Meagher's speech outweighed any interest that the
defendants had in preventing unnecessary disruptions and inefficiencies in the workplace.
7
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Therefore, the court found that Meagher’s speech was protected and that her termination violated
her rights under the First Amendment.
D. Exclusive Representation
D'Agostino v. Baker, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2023 (1st Cir. Feb. 5, 2016)
This was one of several lawsuits in which anti-union plaintiffs challenged the long
established rights of unions to exclusively represent employees in public sector bargaining. In a
decision written by former Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the Court firmly rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims. The court explained, that non-union public employees have no cognizable claim
that their First Amendment associational rights were violated by the union acting as an exclusive
bargaining agent with the state. The court explained,
. . . that result is all the clearer under Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v.
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 79 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1984), which ruled against First
Amendment claims brought by public college faculty members, professional employees of
a state education system, who challenged a legislative mandate that a union selected as
their exclusive bargaining agent be also the exclusive agent to meet with officials on
educational policy beyond the scope of mandatory labor bargaining. The Court held that
neither a right to speak nor a right to associate was infringed, id. at 289; like the appellants
here, the academic employees in Knight could speak out publicly on any subject and were
free to associate themselves together outside the union however they might desire. Their
academic role was held to give them no variance from the general rules that there is no
right to compel state officials to listen to them, id. at 286, and no right to eliminate the
amplification that an exclusive agent necessarily enjoys in speaking for the unionized
majority, id. at 288.
The Court also rejected the Plaintiffs attempts to use the recent Supreme Court decision in
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014) to justify their claims.
Two district courts have similarly read Knight as confirming that exclusive representation
by a union does not infringe non-members' associational rights. See Jarvis v. Cuomo, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56443 (N.D.N.Y Apr. 30, 2015)(Addressed in the 2015 Legal Updated); Bierman v.
Dayton, No. 14-3021, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150504, 2014 WL 5438505, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct.
22, 2014).
E. Agency Fee
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014)
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its much awaited decision in the Harris case
in which the plaintiffs requested that the Court rule unconstitutional the charging of agency fees
8
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/69
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1627

12

Nisenson: Annual Legal Update (2016)

in the public sector. The Court rejected these attempts to alter the agency fee jurisprudence as it
has existed in the public sector for over 35 years since the Court issued its seminal decision in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Here, in a 5 to 4 opinion issued by
Justice Alito, the Court questioned the foundation of Abood, but specifically stated that it was
unnecessary for the Court to reach the argument that Abood should be overruled. Instead, the
Court ruled that agency fees could not be imposed on certain “partial-public” employees, a
category that likely has little applicability to faculty members at public institutions. However, the
Court’s majority decision questioned the underlying validity of Abood, and prompted lawsuits and
appeals directly challenging whether the charging of agency fees in the public sector is
constitutional, leading to the Friedrichs case. (See 2015 Legal Update for further details regarding
the Court’s decision in Harris.)
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 14-915,
argued (Jan. 11, 2016)
This case involves a claim that charging agency fees to non-members to support union
representation in the public sector is unconstitutional. The case started when the plaintiffs,
sponsored by organizations seeking to weaken unions, sued the California Teachers Association
and a local California school district seeking to invalidate agency fee provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement, arguing that agency fee clauses in the public sector violate the First
Amendment. On June 29, 2015 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and thereby agreed to hear
the appeal. The AAUP amicus brief argues that collective bargaining, supported by the agency fee
system, significantly benefits the educational system, and that removal of the ability to charge
agency fees would upset the balance set by the states and burden the rights of union members.
Agency fee has been deemed constitutional since the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court declined to
overrule Abood, although the Court raised questions regarding its vitality. Anti-union groups
brought the Friedrichs case in California and pushed it through the courts. In the Supreme Court,
the Friedrichs plaintiffs have advanced the argument that all agency fee arrangements in the public
sector violate the First Amendment as they compel non-members to pay for activities that they
believe address matters of public concern. The plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that even if
some agency fee system is constitutional, the current opt-out system of charging agency fee payers
in unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court accepted two questions for review: (1) Whether Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated
under the First Amendment; and (2) whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public
employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions.
Given the questions before the Court there are several potential outcomes. First, the Court
could answer “no” to both questions, and leave the law status quo. Second, the Court could answer
the first question in the affirmative, and it would overrule Abood and prohibit agency fee in the
public sector. This would impose a right to work style system nationwide in the public
9
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sector. (This would render the second question before the Court moot.) Third, the Court could
answer the first question “no”, thereby allowing agency fee, but could answer the second question
“yes”. The second question addresses the current law regarding agency fee payers and objectors.
Under the current law, non-members can be charged a rate equivalent to full union dues unless
they affirmatively object. Once a non-member affirmatively objects, they can only be charged the
agency fee rate. This creates an “opt-out” situation in which non-members must affirmatively opt
out to pay the lower agency fee rate. If the Court answered the second question “yes”, then agency
fee would still be permissible, but all non-members would be considered objectors automatically
and could therefore only be charged the lower agency fee rate. Finally, in answering the questions,
the Court could leave some charges for agency fee standing, while substantially changing the
amount that can be permissibly collected. For example, the Court could narrow the types of activity
for which agency fees can be charged, such as by excluding from chargeable activity work such
as bargaining for tenure or pay. It is difficult to anticipate what such a ruling would look like.
On November 13, 2015 AAUP filed with American Federation of Teachers, an amicus
brief before the Supreme Court arguing that the payment of agency fees by non-members in
collective bargaining unions to support union representation is constitutional. The amicus brief
supports the charging of agency fees and provides examples from AAUP higher education chapters
of the benefits of the agency fee system. The brief provides strong arguments in favor of the agency
fee system including that agency fees are an essential component of the states’ management of
some of their most important institutions; that petitioners’ facial, all-or-nothing challenge to all
aspects of every agency fee ever charged anywhere, on the basis of no record at all, should be
rejected on its face; and that to the extent the court entertains petitioners’ facial claim, it must
account for petitioners’ failure to challenge the underlying regime of exclusive representation in
collective bargaining. The brief explains that “fair share fees are . . . used to fund a wide range of
. . . activities that promote the state’s compelling interest in providing students a high quality
education and directly benefit nonmembers.” Thus, based on the significant benefits provided by
agency fees, compared to the minimal burdens, charging agency fees to non-members does not
violate the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Friederichs case on Monday, January 11,
2016. In a turn of historical significance, the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia will
have repercussions for Friedrichs. While no one knows for sure what will happen, Scalia's death
strengthens the likelihood that the forty years of precedent finding agency fees constitutional will
not be overturned in this case.
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6218 (N.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 2016)
This case involved disputes regarding the refund of agency fees collected from non-union
members who were partial public employees under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v.
Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014). The plaintiffs were individuals operating home child care
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businesses. They are covered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris which ruled that
collection of agency fees from these individuals violated to the First Amendment.
After the Harris decision was issued, the Union and the employer negotiated a new
collective bargaining agreement that did not require the deduction of agency fees. The union also
rebated to the plaintiffs agency fees that were collected after the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Harris. The plaintiffs continued to prosecute their suit arguing that the Union was obligated to
rebate them for agency fees paid prior to the Court’s decision in Harris.
The district court found that the Union was not obligated to make such a reimbursement as
the union relied in good faith when it collected the agency fees prior to Harris. The Court
explained,
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not contain any allegations that CSEA acted in bad faith in
collecting the fee prior to Harris. To the contrary, the record indicates that CSEA acted in
good faith when relying on the validly enacted state legislation that authorized the fair share
fee as well as prior Supreme Court precedent authorizing a similar payment assessment in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1971).
Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants took reasonable measures to make Plaintiffs
whole after the Harris decision was issued. Accordingly, the Court finds that the good-faith
defense applies to the CSEA Defendants and therefore, they cannot be liable for damages
based on the collection of fees from Plaintiffs prior to July 1, 2014.

III.

FOIA/Subpoenas and Academic Freedom
Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case No. 2CACV2015-0086 (Ariz. App. Ct., Second App. Div., Dec. 3, 2015) (unpublished)
In a case in which the AAUP filed an amicus brief, the Arizona Court of Appeals remanded
a dispute involving a request for climate scientists’ research records so that the trial court could
weigh de novo the University’s “contention that disclosure of the records would be detrimental to
the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of disclosure.” The case arose from
a public records request for extensive material from two climate scientists submitted by a legal
foundation seeking to use records requests in an attempt to “put false science on trial.” The AAUP
filed an amicus brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and earlier with the trial court, arguing
that academic freedom to conduct research is essential to a vital university system, and to the
common good, and warranted protecting certain research records from disclosure.
This case arose from a lawsuit filed by Energy & Environment Legal Institute, a “free
market” legal foundation using public records requests in a campaign against climate science. E &
E, previously known as the American Tradition Institute, brought similar cases involving public
records requests of faculty members, including in the case of American Tradition Institute v.
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Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014), in which the AAUP
filed an amicus brief successfully opposing the ATI records request.
E & E submitted public records requests that targeted two University of Arizona faculty
members, climate researchers Professors Malcolm Hughes and Jonathan Overpeck. E & E sought
emails authored by or addressed or copied to them. The emails were, in turn, linked to eight other
individuals, each of whom is or was then a professor or researcher at another private or public
university. As E & E counsel has stated, the suit is supposedly intended to “put false science on
trial” and E & E vows to “keep peppering universities around the country with similar requests
under state open records laws.” The case was originally heard by the Superior Court in Pima
County Arizona in late 2014.
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in the lower court on September 25, 2014. The brief
argued, “when public records requests target information that implicates principles of academic
freedom, courts must balance the public’s general right to disclosure against the significant chilling
effects that will result from forcing scholars and institutions to disclose collegial academic
communications and internal deliberative materials.” On March 24, 2015, the court ruled that the
University did not have to disclose the records. The decision noted that the argument regarding the
potential chilling effect of the disclosures was key to the decision.
E &E appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. On October 23, 2015, the
AAUP filed a brief in support of the University and the scientists. The brief was drafted by AAUP
General Counsel Risa Lieberwitz, with input from AAUP Litigation Committee members, local
Arizona Counsel Don Awerkamp and others. The brief argued that academic freedom warranted
protecting the research records from disclosure. One key consideration under Arizona law is
whether disclosure is “in the best interests of the state.” The brief explained that “Courts should
consider the best interests of the state to maintain a free and vital university system, which depends
on the protection of academic freedom to engage in the free and open scientific debate necessary
to create high quality academic research. Where the requests seek prepublication communications
and other unpublished academic research materials, as in the case at bar, compelled disclosure
would have a severe chilling effect on intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.”
In its decision, the Court of Appeals focused solely on the burden of proof applied by the
trial court and did not address the substantive question regarding whether the release of the records
was appropriate. The trial court had ruled that the issue was whether the University had abused its
discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to disclose the records. The Court of
Appeals determined that this was not the appropriate burden of proof. The Court of Appeals held
“the trial court was required de novo to weigh the [University’s] contention that disclosure of the
records would be detrimental to the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of
disclosure. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the court’s order pertaining to e-mails addressing
‘prepublication critical analysis, unpublished data, analysis, research, results, drafts and
commentary’ and remand so that the court may balance the countervailing interests and determine
whether E&E is entitled to access those e-mails.” (Citations omitted.) On remand the trial court
will again need to consider the argument that disclosure of such research records is not in the best
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interests of the state as the disclosure harms academic freedom and would have a severe chilling
effect on intellectual debate.
Highland Mining Company v. West Virginia University School of Medicine, 774 S.E.2d
36 (W.V. 2015)
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia shielded from disclosure a former West
Virginia University researcher’s records of his work concerning the health effects of mountaintopremoval mining. The order the granting in part and denying in part Highland Mining Company's
(Highland) request for documents related to several articles co-authored by a professor from the
West Virginia University School of Medicine (WVU). The scholar, Michael Hendryx, led a
research project that found that people living near mountaintop-removal mines faced higher risks
of cancer and premature death. A mining company had sued the university for access to records of
Mr. Hendryx’s research.
The court held that pursuant to the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
WVU may use FOIA's "internal memorandum" exemption to withhold documents that reflect the
professor's deliberative process. The court explained that the “involuntary public disclosure” of
the professor’s research documents “would expose the decision-making process in such a way as
to hinder candid discussion of WVU’s faculty and undermine WVU’s ability to perform its
operations”. However, the court also ruled that the University could not invoke FOIA's "personal
privacy" exemption to protect documents containing anonymous peer review comments of the
draft articles (although those documents would be exempt from disclosure under the "internal
memoranda" exemption). Finally, the court concluded that WVU may not claim an "academic
freedom" privilege to avoid the plain language of FOIA because the state does not have an
academic-freedom exemption to its public-records law.
The American Tradition Institute and Honorable Delegate Robert Marshall v. Rector &
Visitors of the University of Virginia & Michael Mann, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014)
In this case the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a professor’s climate
research records were exempt from disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act as
academic research records. The Court explained that the exclusion of University research records
from disclosure was intended to prevent “harm to university-wide research efforts, damage to
faculty recruitment and retention, undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and
confidentiality, and impairment of free thought and expression.” While the decision was limited
to a Virginia statute, it provided a strong rationale for the defense of academic records from
disclosure. (See 2014 Legal Update for further details regarding the Court’s decision.)
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IV.

Tenure, Due Process, Breach of Contract, and Pay
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract
Langenkamp v. New York University, Case 14-3861 (2nd Cir. Oct. 15, 2015).

A professor was terminated and she argued that the university’s offer of employment
including an agreement to abide by all university policies including the faculty handbook
constituted a breach of contract. The faculty handbook specified procedures for the university to
follow before terminating an employee. Although New York has a well-established at-will
employment doctrine, the court narrowly ruled that the professor’s breach of contract claim be
remanded for further proceedings. The policies in a personnel manual specifying the employer’s
practices with respect to the employment relationship, including procedures or grounds for
termination, may become part of the employment contact IF (i) an express written policy limiting
the employer’s right of discharge exists, (ii) the employer made the employee aware of this policy,
and (iii) the employee detrimentally relied on the policy in accepting or continuing employment.
Salaita v. Kennedy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102854 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2015)
Professor Salaita was offered, and accepted, a tenured position at the University of Illinois,
to begin in August 2014, but on August 1, in response to angry tweets by the professor, he was
notified by the university’s chancellor that she would not take the ordinarily routine step of
submitting the appointment to the board of trustees for approval. Professor Salaita sued arguing
that the refusal to appoint him to the tenured position was a breach of contract and violated his
constitutional rights. The court denied the university’s motion to dismiss and ruled that the
professor’s contract was not negated by the "subject to approval by the Board of Trustees"
language in his letter. The court reasoned that this language was simply a part of the university's
performance, since everything else about the letter, and the university's subsequent conduct,
indicated that a binding contract had been made once the professor signed a form at the bottom of
the letter indicating his formal acceptance. The court noted that, "the University's argument, if
applied consistently, would wreak havoc" in academia: "the entire American academic hiring
process as it now operates would cease to exist, because no professor would resign a tenure
position, move states and start teaching at a new college based on an 'offer' that was absolutely
meaningless until after the semester already started." The court also ruled that the professor had a
viable claim for violation of his due process rights, since the contract gave him a "property interest"
in his job. The decision is a victory for the AAUP, who censured the university in June 2015.
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B. Tenure – Constitutionality
Vergara v. California, Case No. B258589 argued (Calif. App. Ct., Second App. Dist.
Feb. 25, 2016)
This case involves an appeal to the California Court of Appeal contesting a ruling by a
California state court judge that found that California statutes providing tenure protections to K–
12 teachers violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution. The case arose
from a challenge, funded by anti-union organizations, to five California statutes that provide
primary and secondary school teachers a two-year probationary period, stipulate procedural
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination, and emphasize teacher seniority in
reductions of force. The trial court judge held that the statutes unconstitutionally impact students’
constitutional right to equality of education and disproportionately burden poor and minority
students. The amicus brief contesting this decision argued that the challenged statutes help protect
teachers from retaliation, help keep good teachers in the classroom by promoting teacher longevity
and discouraging teacher turnover, and allow teachers to act in students’ interests in presenting
curricular material and advocating for students within the school system.
The challenged statutes in the California Education Code establish: a two-year
probationary period during which new teachers may be terminated without cause, due process
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination for cause, and procedures for
implementing budget-based reductions-in-force. After an eight-week bench trial, Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Rolf Michael Treu, in a short sixteen-page opinion containing only
superficial analysis, adopted the plaintiffs’ theories in full, striking down each challenged statute
as unconstitutional. In doing so, Judge Treu improperly used the “strict scrutiny” standard and
failed to adequately consider the substantial state interest in providing statutory rights of tenure
and due process for K–12 teachers in the public schools.
Instead, Judge Treu accepted wholesale testimony given by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
Based on this testimony, the court concluded that “the specific effect of grossly ineffective teachers
on students . . . shocks the conscience” and that “there are a significant number of grossly
ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms” who have “a direct, real,
appreciable, and negative impact on a significant number of California students . . . .” Although
he did not cite evidence showing a causal link between the statutes and students’ constitutional
rights, Judge Treu held that the statutes unconstitutionally impact students’ fundamental right to
equality of education and disproportionately burden poor and minority students. Judge Treu stayed
his ruling pending appeal. The State Defendants and Intervenors California Teachers Association
and California Federation of Teachers appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California
for the Second Appellate District.
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of tenure. The AAUP has a particular interest
in defending the due process protections of tenure at all levels of education. The brief, primarily
authored by Professor Charlotte Garden, an expert in labor law and constitutional law and litigation
director of the Korematsu Center for Law & Equality at Seattle University, advanced two
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substantive arguments. First, the brief explained that by helping to insulate teachers from backlash
or retaliation, the challenged statutes allow teachers to act in students’ interests in deciding when
and how to present curricular material and to advocate for students within their schools and
districts. In so doing, the brief recognized the distinction between the academic freedom rights of
primary and secondary school teachers and those of professors in colleges and universities.
Second, the brief argued that students are better off when good teachers remain in their classrooms,
and the challenged statutes promote teacher longevity and discourage teacher turnover.
Oral arguments in Vergara v. State of California were heard on Thursday, February 25 in
Los Angeles. The three-judge panel has 90 days to reach a decision. However, both sides have said
they intend to appeal if they lose this case, so it is likely that the case will move on to the California
Supreme Court.
C. Faculty Handbooks
Report of the NLRB General Counsel Concerning Employer Rules, NLRB GC 15_04,
(NLRB General Counsel March 18, 2015)
The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board recently published a
guidance memorandum that provides specific examples of lawful and unlawful employee
handbook rules in the areas of confidentiality, professionalism and employee conduct, use of
company logos, copyrights and trademarks, conflicts of interest, photography and recording, and
interaction with the media and other third parties.
The NLRB and its General Counsel have aggressively scrutinized many frequently used
employee handbook provisions for potentially infringing on the right of employees to engage in
concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In
addition to the right to engage in union organizing, Section 7 activity includes the right to
discuss, challenge, question, and advocate changes in wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment in both unionized and non-unionized work environments. The NLRB
will deem an employee handbook provision to violate the NLRA if it specifically prohibits
Section 7 activity or if "employees would reasonably construe" the rule as prohibiting such
activity. It is this "reasonably construe" language that has resulted in many common employee
handbook provisions being declared unlawful by the NLRB.
The guidance section that may be most applicable to faculty members is one that
addresses the legality of employer rules regarding the conduct of employees towards the
University and supervisors or management. The General Counsel explained.
Employees also have the Section 7 right to criticize or protest their employer's
labor policies or treatment of employees. Thus, rules that can reasonably be read
to prohibit protected concerted criticism of the employer will be found unlawfully
overbroad. For instance, a rule that prohibits employees from engaging in
"disrespectful," "negative," "inappropriate," or "rude" conduct towards the
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employer or management, absent sufficient clarification or context, will usually
be found unlawful. See Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 3 (Dec.
16, 2014). Moreover, employee criticism of an employer will not lose the Act's
protection simply because the criticism is false or defamatory, so a rule that bans
false statements will be found unlawfully overbroad unless it specifies that only
maliciously false statements are prohibited. Id. at 4. On the other hand, a rule that
requires employees to be respectful and professional to coworkers, clients, or
competitors, but not the employer or management, will generally be found lawful,
because employers have a legitimate business interest in having employees act
professionally and courteously in their dealings with coworkers, customers,
employer business partners, and other third parties.
Similar language may be used in University policies or handbooks, particularly in
relation to “civility clauses.” However, employees should be cautious as this is a complicated
area, and simply because it appears a portion of the manual may be covered by the above does
not mean that a faculty member can avoid termination for violating the manual.
D. Overtime Pay

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Defining and Delimiting the Exemption for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
38515 (Dept. of Labor July 6, 2015)
This notice involves the standards under which employees are considered “exempt”, and
therefore not entitled to overtime pay, under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Department of
Labor (DOL)’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has proposed revisions to the executive,
administrative and professional exemptions — known as the “white collar” exemptions — under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the current regulations, an individual must satisfy three
criteria to qualify as an exempt “white collar” employee: first, he or she must be paid on a
salaried basis (the salary basis test); second, that salary must be at least $455/week, or $23,660
annually (the minimum salary requirement or salary threshold); and third, his or her “primary
duties” must be consistent with executive, professional or administrative positions as defined by
DOL (the primary duties test). Note that the first two criteria do not apply to professors, teachers
and many student workers.
In order to maintain the effectiveness of the salary level test, the DOL proposed to set the
standard salary level equal to the 40th percentile of earnings for full-time salaried workers
(projected to be $50,440 for a full-year worker in the first quarter of 2016). The DOL also
proposed to set the highly compensated employee annual compensation level equal to the 90th
percentile of earnings for full-time salaried workers ($122,148 annually), up from the current
$100,000 threshold. Furthermore, in order to prevent the levels from becoming outdated, the
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DOL proposed including in the regulations a mechanism to automatically update the salary and
compensation thresholds on an annual basis using either a fixed percentile of wages or the CPIU.
DOL is also considering making changes to the duties tests. No changes are proposed to
the primary duties test, but WHD has asked several questions on the topic, suggesting it is
considering adopting a quantification requirement similar to California’s, where employees have
to perform the exempt primary duties “more than 50 percent” of the time. Although the DOL
hasn’t suggested changing the executive, administrative, professional, computer or outside sales
duties tests, it did ask for comments on whether the tests should be changed and whether they’re
working to screen out employees who are not bona fide white collar exempt employees.
Any substantial changes issued by the DOL could result in significant changes to the
salaries and working conditions of University employees (though likely excluding most faculty
and student workers.) Such chances could of course trigger bargaining obligations or
opportunities.

V.

Discrimination and Affirmative Action
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, cert granted 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015)
This is the second time the Supreme Court has considered Fisher’s challenge to the use of
race as a consideration in the University of Texas’ holistic admission process, and the fourth time
AAUP has joined an amicus brief in the case.
The case arose when Abigail Fisher, a white student, challenged the university's
consideration of race in the undergraduate admissions process when she was denied admission.
Fisher argued that UT Austin's use of race in admissions decisions violated her right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1996, the Texas Legislature adopted the Top 10
Percent Law. Under this law, seniors in the top 10 percent of their high school class were
guaranteed admission to any Texas state university. The primary objective of the law is to draw
in the best students from each Texas school, including students from predominantly black or
Hispanic areas, in order to achieve higher levels of diversity. Following the Supreme Court
upholding a race-conscious admissions program at the University of Michigan Law School in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), UT Austin reinstated a consideration of race in
admissions decisions for those who did not fall within the Top 10 Percent Law.
Fisher filed a lawsuit challenging UT Austin’s decision to deny her admission. The case
was first heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010, and the AAUP signed onto the
American Council on Education (ACE) amicus brief submitted to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth
Circuit ruled in favor of UT Austin and the Fifth Circuit’s first decision was appealed to the
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Supreme Court in 2012. In that appeal, the question presented was whether the Supreme Court's
decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including
Grutter, permitted UT Austin's use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions. Fisher
claimed that either this use of race did not fall into the constitutional parameters of Grutter or
that Grutter must be overturned. In August 2012, the AAUP signed onto an amicus brief
authored by ACE with 39 other higher education groups. The amici argued that the educational
benefits that come from a diverse student body are a compelling state interest and, second,
colleges and universities must be allowed to make autonomous decisions when determining the
composition of their student bodies.
On June 24, 2013, by a vote of 7 to 1, the Supreme Court followed long standing
precedent and recognized that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in ensuring
student body diversity, and can take account of an individual applicant’s race as one of several
factors in their admissions program as long as the program is narrowly tailored to achieve that
compelling interest. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)(Fisher I).
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the court below had not properly applied the “strict
scrutiny” standard and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit. In November 2013, the
AAUP again signed onto ACE’s amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit which reiterated the arguments
enumerated above. In July 2014, for the second time the Fifth Circuit upheld the UT Austin
admissions plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). Fisher petitioned
to have the Supreme Court review the case (again) and that request was granted on June 29,
2015.
In Fisher II, the AAUP joined an amicus brief filed on October 30, 2015 in the Supreme
Court arguing that consideration of race in the admission process was appropriate. For many
years, AAUP has taken a leadership role in affirmative action debates by emphasizing the
educational value of diversity. As early as 1978, AAUP filed an amicus brief in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke to protect the primacy of the faculty role in developing
educationally appropriate admissions criteria. In addition, AAUP policy has long supported the
value of diversity in education. See, e.g. “Affirmative Action Plans: Recommended Procedures
for Increasing the Number of Minority Persons and Women on College and University
Faculties,” AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 157-163 (11th ed. 2015). In continuing this
tradition, the AAUP joined the amicus brief in Fisher II, authored by ACE and joined by 37
other higher education organizations.
The Fisher II amicus brief argued that the interest in a diverse student body is compelling
because it is grounded in educational benefit; and that interest is rooted in educational judgment.
In Grutter and Fisher I, the Supreme Court made clear that when an institution sets its
educational goals—including a goal of attaining the educational benefit of a diverse student
body—it makes an educational judgment that merits judicial regard. That interest can also justify
narrowly tailored consideration of race in admissions as part of holistic review of individual
applicants. Narrow tailoring should not be interpreted to forbid race-conscious holistic review
simply because the review operates concurrently with race-neutral mechanisms. Thus the brief
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concluded that the Supreme Court has permitted institutions to take race into account as a
consideration in the admissions decision, and it should continue to do so.
B. Sexual Misconduct – Title IX
Letter from Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education, (Feb. 17, 2016)
This letter from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) responded to an inquiry from
Congressman James Lankford who posed several questions regarding OCR’s position and the
status of its 2010 and 2011 “Dear Colleague” letters. In addressing one important issue, the OCR
confirmed that these Dear Colleague letters do not have the force of law or regulation. OCR
explained “it is Title IX and the regulation, which has the force and effect of law, . . . not OCR’s
2011 (or any other)” Dear Colleague letter. “Instead, OCR”s guidance is issued to advise the
public of its construction of the statutes and regulations it administers and enforces.” The fact
that these “Dear Colleague” letters do not have the force of law could have significant
consequences if colleges and universities seek to use the letters to justify abrogating prior
agreements or established policies.
Sanning v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College, Case No. 4:15-cv-05055 (E.D. Wa.
Dec. 9, 2015)
This case arose from the termination of a Professor by Whitman College as the result of a
Title IX investigation. The plaintiff alleged that in terminating the professor, the College violated
its own policies and procedures and discriminated against him based on sex. One of the primary
arguments advanced by the college was that it was required by law, in the form of the OCR’s
“Dear Colleague” letters, to depart from its own policies and procedures. In a short ruling, the
court found that there were sufficient allegations that the College treated Sanning differently
because of his sex which supposedly “led to a process which violated the Grievance Policy
adopted by Whitman and ultimately lead to Sanning’s employment being terminated.” Therefore,
the court denied the College’s motion to dismiss the case.
VI.

Intellectual Property
A. Patent and Copyright Cases
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth
Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention
(Libr. of Congress Oct. 30, 2015)

Section 1201 of the Copyright Act, which was part of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) of 1998, bars the “circumvention” of “technological protection measures” that
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control access to copyrighted works. Every three years the Librarian of Congress (advised by the
Copyright Office) issues a set of exceptions to the 1201 rules to allow for lawful uses that might
otherwise be discouraged by the law. Educators have participated in this process, which began in
2000, for many years, and have successfully obtained exceptions that have grown incrementally
over time to encompass more uses, more types of media, and more users.
AAUP signed onto Public and Reply Comments submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office
authored by the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Clinic at the American University
Washington College of Law, and the Intellectual Property, Arts, and Technology Clinic,
University of California, Irvine School of Law, which support faculty use of excerpts of certain
audiovisual material and research for educational purposes.
On October 30, 2015, the Library of Congress announced its exemptions to DMCA---the
new rules allow documentary filmmakers and authors offering film analysis to access encrypted
content from DVDs, Blu-ray discs and digitally transmitted video in order to criticize or comment
on that content in their works. The previous version of this rule did not permit these creators to
access Blu-ray; and the new rules also allow faculty and in some cases students to copy short
portions of protected works for use in criticism or commentary where close analysis of the clip is
necessary for the following formats: DVD, streaming video delivery and BLU-RAY. The prior
rules allowed use of DVD and streaming for these purposes, but BLU-RAY is new to this cycle.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014)
In this case the Second Circuit recently ruled that various universities (collectively referred
to as “HathiTrust”) did not violate the Copyright Act of 1976 when they digitally reproduced
books, owned by the universities’ respective libraries, as the doctrine of "fair use" allowed them
to create a full-text searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in
formats accessible to those with disabilities. (See 2014 Legal Update for further details regarding
the Court’s decision.)

VII.

Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Private Sector
A. NLRB Authority
1. Recess Appointments
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014)
On June 26, 2014, the U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to
the NLRB because they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause. (See
2014 Legal Update for further details regarding the Court’s decision.)
The case arose when, in January 2012, President Obama filled three vacancies on the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) through recess appointments, after a Senate minority had
21
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used the filibuster rule to block a Senate vote on the nominees. Under the Constitution’s Recess
Appointments Clause, “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their
next Session.” U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 3. The three NLRB appointments preserved a quorum in
the agency, allowing it to conduct business. During this period, from December 17, 2011 to
January 23, 2012, the Senate held pro forma sessions during which no business was conducted but
the Senate was not adjourned for more than three days. The President asserted that the Senate was
in recess despite these pro forma sessions, giving him authority to exercise his recess-appointment
power during this period.
The U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to the NLRB because
they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause. However, the Court
divided by a vote of 5-4 on what types of recess appointments are permissible. The majority held
in its controlling opinion that recess appointments can be made during any recess of at least ten
days, regardless of whether the recess is an intersession recess or an intrasession recess and
regardless of when the vacancies being filled arose.
Generally, after the Noel Canning decision was issued, the Board issued an order in many
of the pending cases setting aside the vacated Decision and Order, and retaining the case on its
docket for further action as appropriate. The Board has subsequently been addressing these cases
on an individual basis. In many of the cases, the Board has issued decisions largely concordant
with the prior Board rulings in the cases, adopting the reasoning of the vacated decisions, with
short summaries of the rationale in the original board decision.
For example in Grand Canyon Education, Inc. d/b/a Grand Canyon University, 28-CA022938, et al.; 362 NLRB No. 13 (February 2, 2015), the Board explained:
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
supra, we have considered de novo the judge’s decision and the record in light of
the exceptions and briefs. We have also considered the now-vacated Decision and
Order, and we agree with the rationale set forth therein. Accordingly, we affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and adopt the judge’s
recommended Order to the extent and for the reasons stated in the Decision
and Order reported at 359 NLRB No. 164, which is incorporated herein by
reference.
In addressing a specific finding, the Board highlighted the issue and adopted the reasoning
of the prior decision. “We agree with the analysis in the vacated Decision and Order regarding
Human Resources Business Partner Rhonda Pigati’s questioning of employee Gloria Johnson,
and we find that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for the reasons stated therein.”

22
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/69
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1627

26

Nisenson: Annual Legal Update (2016)

2. Religiously Affiliated Institutions
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014)(With Regional Director
decisions.)
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board modified the standards used to determine two
important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education
institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions
and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities;
and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of
the Act. See infra.
The question of whether faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction
and coverage of the Act has long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision
in Catholic Bishops serving as the foundation for any analysis. In Pacific Lutheran University,
the Board established a two-part test for determining jurisdiction. First, whether “as a threshold
matter, [the university] holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if
so, then, second, whether “it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific
role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”
The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious
environment.
In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members. The Board explained,
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.”
The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment
to diversity or academic freedom.
Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific Lutheran University held itself
out as providing a religious educational environment, the petitioned-for faculty members were not
performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to
the question of whether certain of the faculty members were managerial employees.
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Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, Regional Directors
issued decisions finding that university faculty were not exempt from Board jurisdiction in Loyola
University Chicago (13-RC-164618), Chicago IL (Reg. 13, December 29, 2015), Loyola
University Chicago (II) (13-RC-168082), Chicago IL (Reg. 13, March 4, 2016), Manhattan
College (02-RC-023543) New York, NY (Reg. 2 August 26, 2015), Saint Xavier University (13RC-022025) Chicago, IL, (Reg. 13, June 1, 2015), Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit (06-RC080933) Pittsburgh, PA, (Reg. 6 June 5, 2015), Seattle University (19-RC-122863) Seattle, WA,
(Reg. 19, August 17, 2015) and finding that a Catholic college was exempt from Board jurisdiction
in Carroll College, (19-RC-165133) Helena MT (Reg. 19, January 19, 2016) teachers at an Islamic
Academy were exempt from Board jurisdiction in Islamic Saudi Academy (05-RC-080474)
Alexandria, VA (Reg. 5 Sept. 1, 2015).

B. Faculty, Graduate Assistants and Players Coverage as Employees Entitled to
Collective Bargaining Representation
1. Faculty as Managers
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014)(With Regional Director
decisions.)
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board also modified the standards used to determine
whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act. This
question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, where the Court found that in certain
circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who are excluded from the protections of
the Act. The Board noted that the application of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and
uncertain set of criteria for making decisions regarding whether faculty were managers. This led
to significant complications in determining whether the test was met and created uncertainty for
all of the parties.
Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated,
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty
constitute managerial employees.”
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for
determining whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the
new standard, “where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will
examine the faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs,
enrollment management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The
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Board will give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that
affect the university as whole.” The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s
decision making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the
university, whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those
areas. If they do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from
the Act’s protections.”
The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . . A faculty handbook
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area,
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation,
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.”
Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without
independent review by the administration.
Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, the Board remanded a
number of cases involving whether faculty members are managers under Yeshiva. In these cases,
the Board generally explained:
On December 16, 2014, the Board issued its decision in Pacific Lutheran
University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), which specifically addressed the standard
the Board will apply for determining, in accordance with NLRB v. Yeshiva
University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), when faculty members are managerial employees,
whose rights to engage in collective bargaining are not protected by the Act.
Accordingly, the Board remands this proceeding to the Regional Director for
further appropriate action consistent with Pacific Lutheran University, including
reopening the record, if necessary. . . . [Note 2] Members Miscimarra and Johnson
adhere to their separate opinions in Pacific Lutheran University. Nevertheless, they
agree with their colleagues that a remand is appropriate.
Point Park University, Case No. 06-RC-01226 (February 25, 2015). See also Seattle University,
Case No. 19-RC-122863 (February 3, 2015).
Applying Pacific Lutheran, Regional Directors issued decisions finding that faculty were
not managers under Yeshiva in University of Southern California, (31-RC-164864 and 31-RC164868) Los Angeles CA (Reg. 31 Dec. 24, 2015), Seattle University (19-RC-122863) Seattle,
WA, (Reg. 19, August 17, 2015) and were managers in Carroll College, (19-RC-165133), Helena
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MT (Reg. 19, January 19, 2016). In Point Park, the employer dropped their objections based on
Yeshiva, and agreed to an election, which the union won.
2. Graduate Assistants Right to Organize
Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), NLRB Case
No. 13-RC-121359 (Aug. 17, 2015)
In a highly publicized case in which the AAUP filed an amicus brief, the National Labor
Relations Board declined to assert jurisdiction over the Northwestern University football players’
petition seeking union representation rendering the players unable to unionize under the auspices
of the NLRB. The Board, however, explicitly limited its decision to the unusual circumstances of
the case, avoiding broader questions involving the unionization of graduate student assistants and
others. The Board concluded that asserting jurisdiction over the Northwestern University
scholarship football players would not promote stability in labor relations due to the unusual facts
of the case, which involved unionizing a single football team rather than teams on a league wide
basis, and the fact that the NCAA and the Big Ten conference maintain substantial control over
individual teams, the overwhelming majority of which are from public colleges and universities
over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction. The Board emphasized that “this case involves
novel and unique circumstances,” repeatedly highlighting the narrow and limited nature of the
decision.
While the Northwestern case was pending, the issue of graduate student assistant
unionization under the NLRA was proceeding in other cases.
Columbia University, NLRB Case No. 02-RC-143012, review granted (Dec. 23, 2015)
This case appears to be one in which the Board will reconsider its holding in Brown
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004) that graduate students were not "employees" for purpose of
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In particular the NLRB issued an
invitation to file amicus briefs addressing whether the Board should modify or overrule its 2004
decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not employees and
therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. 342 NLRB 483 (2004).
The case arose when the United Autoworkers sought to organize student employees who
provide instructional services, including graduate assistants, at Columbia University. In opposing
the efforts to unionize, the University argued that graduate assistants are not “employees” under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore do not have statutory rights to choose
whether to be represented by a union. In doing so the University relied on a 2004 decision by the
Board in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483, which held that graduate student assistants who
perform services at a university in connection with their studies are not statutory employees under
the NLRA.
The NLRB Regional Director initially dismissed the election petition, without a factual
hearing, finding that it sought an election among graduate students who are not employees pursuant
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to the Board's decision in Brown. The union appealed and the Board remanded the case for hearing
so that evidence could be presented that would allow the Board to reconsider the Brown decision.
A twelve-day hearing was held before an NLRB hearing officer in New York City. The Regional
Director issued a decision on October 30, 2015, which included lengthy factual findings regarding
the duties and compensation of graduate assistants at Columbia University. Nonetheless, the
Regional Director dismissed the election petition, stating “I conclude that I am constrained by
Brown, which holds that graduate assistants are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section
2(3) of the Act. Because the Petitioner seeks to represent individuals employed in classifications
which fall within the term, ‘graduate assistants,’ Brown is controlling.”
The Union appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, and on December 23, 2015,
the Board granted the request for review. On January 13, 2016, the Board issued a Notice and
Invitation to File Briefs inviting amici parties to address one or more of four questions. Two of the
questions directly addressed the Brown decision: “1) Should the Board modify or overrule Brown
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which held that graduate student assistants who perform
services at a university in connection with their studies are not statutory employees within the
meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act? 2) If the Board modifies or overrules
Brown University, supra, what should be the standard for determining whether graduate student
assistants engaged in research are statutory employees, including graduate student assistants
engaged in research funded by external grants? See New York University, 332 NLRB 1205, 1209
fn. 10 (2000) (relying on Leland Stanford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974)).”
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the National Labor Relations Board arguing that
graduate assistants at private sector institutions should be considered employees with collective
bargaining rights in keeping with its long history of support for the unionization of graduate
assistants. The AAUP has previously filed numerous amicus briefs arguing the graduate assistants
are employees with rights to unionize under the NLRA, has issued statements affirming the rights
of graduate assistants to unionize, and has an active committee on graduate students and
professional employees that represents the interests of graduate students.
The AAUP brief in this case addressed the two questions involving the Brown decision.
The brief argued that graduate assistants, including those working on federal grant funded research,
are employees with the right to unionize under the NLRA and it refuted the Brown decision’s
speculative claims that collective bargaining would compromise academic freedom and the
cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees.
The brief cited three reasons why graduate student assistants perform work in return for
compensation and are thus employees under the Act. First, when graduate students work as
teaching and research assistants, their work is indistinguishable from that performed by university
faculty. Second, graduate students teach because they are paid, not because it is at the core of
graduate education. Third, universities generally treat any stipend as payment for teaching or
supporting the professor’s research, not as general financial support to enable the graduate student
to attend class or conduct his or her own dissertation research.
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In rebutting the argument that unionization would threaten academic freedom, the brief
pointed out that unions, through collective bargaining agreements, often promote the cause of
academic freedom.
Local AAUP chapters have successfully established explicit guarantees of academic
freedom in their collective bargaining contracts. Some chapters of unionized faculty refer
to the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure and quote
it extensively in their collective bargaining contracts. Other faculty collective bargaining
agreements to which an AAUP chapter is a party incorporate the language of the 1940
Statement to define academic freedom. These contracts make promises of academic
freedom legally enforceable.
In refuting the speculative claim that collective bargaining would compromise the
cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees, the AAUP
brief cited real life examples and large empirical studies of unionized campuses. The brief
highlighted a recent study that is particularly compelling.
[A] 2013 study comparing student-faculty relationships, academic freedom, and economic
well-being across unionized and non-unionized campuses confirmed the findings of prior
surveys: unionization does not interfere with faculty-student relationships or harm the
education or training of graduate students. See Sean E. Rodgers, Adrienne E. Eaton, &
Paula B. Voos, Effects of Unionization on Graduate Student Employees: Student Relations,
Academic Freedom, and Pay, 66 ILR Review 487-501 (2013). . . . Comparing unionized
and non-unionized graduate student employees in terms of faculty-student relations,
academic freedom, and pay, the study found that union represented graduate student
employees reported higher levels of personal and professional support and unionized
graduate student employees fared better on pay.
Therefore, AAUP brief concluded that “the Board should overrule the test of employee status
applied in Brown University and return to its well-reasoned NYU decision, which found
collective bargaining by graduate assistants compatible with academic freedom.”
The New School, NLRB Case No. 02-RC-143009, review granted (Oct. 21, 2015)
This case involved a petition for election by graduate students aimed at having the Board
reconsider and reverse its holding in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004) that graduate
students were not "employees" for purpose of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Initially, the Region 2 Director rejected the petition, without a hearing or argument,
based on the Board’s decision in Brown. The Union appealed, and on March 13, 2015 the Board
concluded that the cases raised substantial issues under the NLRA, and cases should not have been
decided without a hearing. In so doing, the Board allowed the parties to provide evidence and
argument regarding whether the Brown case should be reconsidered or reversed. After conducting
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a hearing following the remand, the Regional Director dismissed the petition a second time. She
concluded, based on the factual record, that the Petitioner seeks an election among graduate
students who are not “employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act under Brown
University, and that the facts did not warrant finding the instant case distinguishable from Brown
University. The Union appealed.
On July 30, 2015, based on seven days of hearing, the Regional Director issued a decision
in The New School case, including extensive discussion of the evidence. While the facts were
generally favorable for the unionization of graduate student assistants, the Regional Director
concluded that she was bound by the Board’s decision in Brown until the Board reconsiders or
overrules that decision. Accordingly, the Regional Director stated, “I conclude that I am
constrained by Brown, which holds that graduate assistants are not ‘employees.’. . . Because the
Petitioner seeks to represent individuals employed in classifications which fall within the term
‘graduate assistants,’ Brown is controlling, and therefore I am dismissing the petition.” On August
13, 2015, the union appealed the Regional Director’s decision, requesting that the Board overrule
Brown University and hold that graduate student assistants are employees with rights to unionize
under the NLRA. On October 21, 2015, the Board voted 3 to 1 to grant a request to review the
decision.
C. Employee Rights to Use Email
Purple Communications, 361 NLRB No. 126 (Dec. 11, 2014)
The National Labor Relations Board recently issued a decision significantly expanding the
right of employees to use their employers' e-mail systems for union organizing and other activities
protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
In Purple Communications the board explained that “the use of email as a common form
of workplace communication has expanded dramatically in recent years.” Therefore the board
ruled that “employee use of email for statutorily protected communications on nonworking time
must presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give employees access to their
email systems.” While the case addressed communications supporting the union during an
organizing drive, given the board's expansion of protected activity, this also includes
communications critical of the employer's employment-related policies, practices and management
decisions.
Therefore, employees who are given access to their employer’s e-mail system for business
purposes now will be able to use that system on non-working time to engage in a wide range of
protected communications, including union support and comments critical of the employer's
employment-related policies and management decisions. While the board did not directly address
other types of electronic equipment and communications, such as instant messaging or texting
from employer-owned smartphones and other devices, the board noted that a similar analysis
would potentially apply.
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However, there are limitations to the decision. First, since the decision was issued by the
NLRB, under the statute protecting private-sector employees, it only applies to private-sector
employees. Second, the board only addressed employee use of work e-mail, and did not extend the
protection to cover use by non-employees. Third, the protected use was limited to non-work time,
and absent discrimination against the union it does not give the employees right to use the work email during work time. Fourth, the employer may in certain limited circumstances prohibit or limit
the use of work e-mail on non-work time. Finally, this ruling will likely be appealed and could be
overturned by the courts.
Nonetheless, this is a major step forward for the rights of faculty members in private
institutions. E-mail is one of the primary ways in which faculty speak to each other in the modern
world. The ability to use email to communicate is essential to faculty, particularly contingent
faculty, who are often dispersed and may not be able to speak directly to each other regularly. This
decision recognizes this reality and provides private-sector faculty members’ use of work email to
communicate with each other about union matters will be protected.
D. Bargaining Units
Lesley University, NLRB Case No. 01-RC-148228 (NLRB Reg. Dir. April 8, 2015)
On April 8, 2015, NLRB Regional Director Jonathan B. Kreisberg issued a decision and
direction of election concerning a representation petition filed by SEIU that seeks to represent a
unit of approximately 181 full-time and regular part-time core faculty employed by Lesley
University including faculty with titles of Instructor, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor,
Professor, and University Professor. In its petition, SEIU seeks to also represent in the proposed
unit approximately 14 faculty employed in the same titles but under temporary contracts.
In his decision, Regional Director Kriesberg rejected the objection by Lesley University to
the inclusion of the temporary faculty in the proposed unit finding that the temporary faculty had
a community of interest with the core faculty because they perform many of the same duties
including teaching, curriculum development, advising students, participating in departmental
meetings and serving on faculty committees. In addition, the two faculty groups was found to
enjoy many of the same terms and conditions of employment. While temporary faculty serve
under contracts for a one-year term, Regional Director Kreisberg concluded that they had a
reasonable expectation of continued employment noting that 35 per cent of temporary faculty have
served for a least two consecutive years notwithstanding their one-year temporary appointments.
E. NLRB Elections
NLRB Election Rules, 29 CFR Parts 101, 102, and 103; Guidance Memorandum on
Representation Case Procedure Changes Effective April 14_ 2015, NLRB GC 15_06,
(NLRB General Counsel April 6, 2015).
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In December 2015 the NLRB issued revisions to union election rules that should vastly
simplify and expedite the election process. Previously, the results of elections could be tied up for
years in pointless litigation, delaying the results of a democratic process, a situation that would be
intolerable in any other context. Specifically, the rule includes the following: Provides for
electronic filing and transmission of election petitions and other documents; Ensures that
employees, employers and unions receive timely information they need to understand and
participate in the representation case process; Eliminates or reduces unnecessary litigation,
duplication and delay; Adopts best practices and uniform procedures across regions; Requires that
additional contact information (personal telephone numbers and email addresses) be included in
voter lists, to the extent that information is available to the employer, in order to enhance
information sharing by permitting other parties to the election to communicate with voters about
the election; and Allows parties to consolidate all election-related appeals to the Board into a single
appeals process. Cumulatively, these changes will likely reduce the time from the filing of a
representation petition to the holding of an election to between 10 and 20 days.
Some of the new provisions are particularly important for faculty members. For example,
the new election rules also require that employers provide the union with personal email addresses
and phone numbers for employees. This is particularly important for reaching out to contingent
faculty, who often perform most of their work off campus. Also, unions must be aware that the
NLRB representation hearing and election process is extremely fast paced and the NLRB will
rarely grant requests for extensions of time. Therefore, unions should be fully aware of the revised
rules and prepared for the hearing and election process prior to filing any election petition with the
NLRB.
VIII.

Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Public Sector
A. Bargaining Units
State of New Jersey v. Council of New Jersey State College Locals, AFT, 2015 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 322 (Superior. Ct., Appellate Div. 2015)
An intermediate New Jersey appellate court has overturned a decision by the New Jersey
Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) dismissing representation petitions for the
unionization of approximately 600 managers at nine New Jersey state colleges and universities.
The court concluded that PERC acted arbitrarily by dismissing the representation cases without
conducting an investigatory hearing to gather evidence to determine whether the employees in the
at-issue positions perform duties and functions that would make them subject to the statutory
exclusion of "managerial executives." Unless the court decision is reversed, the cases will return
to PERC for a hearing to determine the managerial status of each position. Notably, the New Jersey
public sector collective bargaining law, unlike the NLRA includes a specific definition concerning
the managerial exemption to the right to unionize for purposes of collective bargaining.
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B. Arbitration
Univ. Sys. Of New Hampshire v. Dorfsman, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 132 (N.H. Dec. 23, 2015)
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld a lower court’s decision to vacate an
arbitrator’s decision that UNH had violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
Union by terminating a Professor’s employment for engaging in an act of "moral turpitude." In
2012, Marco Dorfsman, an Associate Professor and Department Chair intentionally lowered the
evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer. UNH terminated Dorfsman's employment
for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of "moral turpitude" within the
meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA,
the parties submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator agreed with UNH that Dorfsman's
conduct constituted an act of "moral turpitude" (a finding that was not contested by either party on
appeal.). The arbitrator determined that, because of several mitigating factors, Dorfsman's
termination did not comport with principles of just cause. At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator
remanded the matter so that the parties could negotiate the proper level of discipline; should they
fail to agree within 30 days, the arbitrator would determine Dorfsman's discipline. UNH filed a
complaint in superior court arguing that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court agreed
with UNH and vacated the arbitration award, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of UNH on several procedural issues, it then addressed
whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The Court highlighted that the parties CBA had
a specific provision governing discipline for “moral turpitude” which stated "If charges involving
moral turpitude are sustained, the bargaining unit member may be terminated immediately and the
bargaining unit member shall not be entitled to receive further pay or benefits." Id. at 13. The Court
held that having found that UNH disciplined Dorfsman for “moral turpitude,” the arbitrator
“erroneously applied a further just cause analysis to misconduct that was enumerated in the CBA
as a proper basis for discharge” and therefore exceeded the scope of his authority.

C. Agency Fee and Exclusive Representation – See Section II, D and E.
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